Onchain Security Roundup: Nov 9 - 15
Nexus Mutual Team
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Kava Lend Drained Through a Dead BUSD Market's Interest Index
TL;DR: On November 14th two wallets borrowed 55.2 million KAVA ($3.8 million at the pre-attack price) from Kava Lend in 127 loans over 98 minutes and never repaid. The flaw sat in the supply-index math of an almost unused BUSD market. The coins were sold on BNB Chain for $2.1 million, KAVA fell nearly 40%, Korean exchanges froze transfers, and Kava will retire the lending app through governance.
Kava Lend is the native lending market on the Kava chain. Each pool tracks a supply index that grows with interest earned divided by the money supplied, defined as cash plus loans minus reserves. By November the BUSD pool was close to dead. Per Bitquery, it owed lenders 440,145 BUSD against 0.003 BUSD in reserves, 5,084 BUSD on loan, and 7,618 BUSD of reserves. The divisor already sat below zero, and the code guarded only against a divisor of zero.
Just after 04:00 UTC on November 14th, the main wallet repaid all 37 open BUSD loans, then made a deposit, a loan, and a withdrawal sized so that the supplied figure came to two base units. Within three minutes the index stood at 671,187, up 243,000 times from 2.76, and the wallet's few thousand BUSD read as 1.26 billion. A helper wallet then deposited BUSD as collateral, borrowed KAVA worth half of it, and was liquidated by the main wallet in the next block; the pool found no BUSD to seize and closed the loan, so the helper kept the KAVA. The loop ran 127 times between 04:04 and 05:42 UTC and took the pool from 55.3 million KAVA to 519. As of November 16th, the Kava Lend module still carries 55.2 million KAVA of supplier claims against 2,643 KAVA borrowed and 518 KAVA in reserves, while the module itself holds only 1,987 KAVA.
Six hours later, a third wallet sold 48.4 million KAVA on BNB Chain in 35 minutes. Bitquery puts the proceeds at $2.1 million, of which $1.2 million went into 2,190 XMR1 on Hyperliquid, and the Relay bridge blocked 612,416 USDT. Upbit, Bithumb, and Coinone halted deposits and withdrawals, and Kava paused the Axelar bridge at 14:05 UTC.
Kava published its incident report on November 16th. It described a lending-accounting vulnerability that inflated the value of BUSD collateral and enabled repeated borrowing and liquidation, named three addresses, and said a portion of the attacker's funds had been frozen. Of the stolen KAVA, 49.2 million was bridged to BNB Chain via LayerZero. Kava says no new KAVA was created and that user deposits were largely unaffected, though the module's books still show the 55.2 million KAVA of supplier claims. A governance proposal will permanently disable new lending and borrowing on HARD Lend. Kava has not quantified the frozen portion or said how suppliers will be made whole, and no funds beyond the Relay block and the unquantified freeze have been recovered to date.
Initia Escrows Emptied Through a Leaked Cloud Key
TL;DR: Initia halted its L1 on November 10th after an attacker who had compromised a Google Cloud key the day before used Initia's rollup platform to validate forged IBC withdrawals from five rollups. Initia says $3.3 million was moved, of which $2.2 million remains frozen on the halted chain; CertiK traced $636,000 that reached Noble, and SlowMist counts $615,000 exited. It is Initia's second exploit in under three weeks. Recovery efforts with law enforcement are ongoing.
Initia is a layer-1 built around a network of application rollups connected by IBC, with assets bridged to each rollup held in escrow accounts on the L1. On October 23rd a MoveVM script-cache flaw let an attacker create unbacked balances and bridge out $2.7 million, per Cointelegraph. This time the chain's code was not the entry point. Initia says that on November 9th an attacker ran a command injection attack using a compromised Google Cloud key that provisions private nodes. That exposed environment variables, which opened Initia's GitHub and cloud accounts and yielded further credentials.
With those credentials, the attacker reached Anvil, the platform that hosts Initia rollups, and validated fraudulent IBC withdrawals from five rollups, which released assets held in the L1 escrows. The attacker sold assets on Initia's DEX and withdrew 13,400 TIA, 8,000 USDC.inj, and 597,000 Noble USDC; no INIT left the chain. CertiK traced $636,000 across 16 IBC transfers from the attacker's address to three Noble addresses, the largest receiving 495,244 USDC. Initia identified the unauthorized escrow transfers and halted the L1 with its validators at 06:18 UTC on November 10th.
Initia puts the total moved at $3.3 million and says $2.2 million of it sits frozen on the halted chain; the difference, ranging from $615,000 per SlowMist and DefiLlama and $636,000 per CertiK, is what reached other chains before the halt. Initia says it intends to restore the backing of affected assets and that asset recovery is ongoing with law enforcement and security partners. Initia has not named the five impacted rollups and has not announced a restart date.
Arcus Subaccount Transfer Bug Paid Out an Inflated Balance
TL;DR: On November 10th a new account on Arcus, a perpetuals exchange on Robinhood Chain, moved funds between its own subaccounts in a way that made its recorded balance read far larger than it held, then withdrew against it. Nine BridgeVault payouts sent 2,234,391 USDG ($2.2 million) to the account's wallet before withdrawals were paused; a further $3 million of requests was held by the bridge's rate limit and reversed, per Arcus. Arcus says it covered the shortfall from the Arcus Labs treasury.
Arcus runs an off-chain order book and matching engine with a permissioned validator chain, settling custody on Robinhood Chain, an Arbitrum-based network. A wallet can hold up to ten subaccounts with independent collateral, and a withdrawal only becomes a token payment once validators publish it to the BridgeVault contract and a separate call pays it. Arcus says a newly created account exploited a bug in how the engine handled transfers between a user's own subaccounts, which under specific conditions let the account record a balance far larger than it actually held. CertiK's analysis of the exchange's saved account history shows the flaw: on the internal transfer at 03:07 UTC the source and recipient balances moved by 2^64 quote units in opposite directions, which is a signed 64-bit integer wrapping past its limit. CertiK notes the engine's production validation path remains unverified, and Arcus describes it only as an accounting bug.
A 1 USDG withdrawal at 03:08 UTC tested the path, then four payouts of 500,000 USDG landed between 03:10 and 03:11 UTC, followed by 55,000, 60,000, 58,471, and 60,919 USDG through 03:53 UTC, 2,234,391 USDG in total to 0xeFbf44…30b3Dd. CertiK counts 15 applied withdrawal requests worth 5,234,391 USDG, of which six, worth 3,000,000 USDG, were never paid because the bridge's onchain rate limit held them.
Arcus says monitoring flagged the withdrawals at 03:15 UTC, and they paused withdrawals platform-wide at 04:07 UTC, deployed a fix at 04:37 UTC, blocked the exploiter's addresses at 04:43 UTC, re-enabled withdrawals at 09:26 UTC, and reversed the held requests at 10:02 UTC. It says the shortfall was fully covered from the Arcus Labs treasury, that no other user balances, positions, or orders were affected, and that it is working with blockchain investigators and law enforcement. CertiK notes the treasury replenishment has not been independently established. No funds have been recovered from the exploiter to date.
Across Protocol Domain Hijacked Through Its Registrar
TL;DR: On November 10th a social engineering attack on Namecheap, Across Protocol's domain registrar, gave an attacker control of across.to according to the Across team. For the next three hours the site served a wallet drainer behind the normal interface. Bitquery counts $348,000 drained from nine wallets on five chains; other tallies reach $402,000, and one Aave depositor reportedly lost $305,000. Across regained the domain by 01:16 UTC on November 11th and has said it will make affected users whole.
Across is an intent-based bridge whose contracts were not impacted by this event. The attack went after the bridge’s domain instead. Across says that at 18:45 UTC on November 10th a social engineering attack on Namecheap, its domain registrar, handed a bad actor control of the Across domain. Visitors to the app during the takeover saw the usual interface, but approvals and signatures went to drainer contracts. Across says it was alerted within 15 minutes and posted at 19:05 UTC telling users not to visit the app, connect a wallet, or sign anything until further notice.
Bitquery counts $348,000 taken from nine wallets on five chains between 19:02 and 21:53 UTC. The weekly tally from researcher Dimitar Dimitrov puts the figure at $402,000, and another security researcher reported that a single Aave depositor lost $305,000 through the hijacked site. The drainer addresses were not published in the sources reviewed, so the range stands as reported rather than as a single reconciled figure.
Across said at 22:13 UTC that the domain was down while it was being secured, and at 01:16 UTC on November 11th that across.to was back under its control and all systems were operating normally, with help from Namecheap's founder to secure the account and open an investigation. Across has said it will make affected users whole. On November 16th Across warned of an uptick in fake phishing domains imitating it. Across has not publicly confirmed a reimbursement timeline.
Edel Finance Team Wallet Emptied of EDEL (root cause not published)
TL;DR: On November 12th Edel Finance said $300,000 worth of its EDEL token had been stolen from a project-controlled wallet and sold across the market. MEXC and BloFin blocked some of the transactions; the rest had already been sold. Edel has not said how the wallet was compromised and has promised a post-mortem. An independent onchain reading attributes the loss to a team Safe with a one-of-two signer threshold.
Edel Finance is a tokenized-equities and margin platform building on Canton, with its EDEL governance token on Ethereum. At 15:30 UTC on November 12th Edel said $300,000 worth of EDEL had been stolen and sold, that it was working with authorities and exchanges to block the attacker, and 24 minutes later that every stolen token had either been sold or blocked by exchanges, thanking MEXC and BloFin for acting quickly. SlowMist and DefiLlama both record the loss at $300,000 with the method unknown.
Edel says a more detailed post-mortem will follow and that the project is continuing. Edel has not publicly confirmed how much was blocked versus sold, and no funds have been recovered to date.
Pool Party Snapshot Contract Let a 10 USDC Deposit Drain Each Pool
TL;DR: On November 13th an attacker took 202,711 USDC from 15 Pool Party pools on Arbitrum and Base; Pool Party puts the loss at $215,000. A flaw in each pool's snapshot contract let the attacker rewrite their recorded position, deposit 10 USDC, and withdraw the whole pool. Pool Party says the fix is live on all four of its chains, that the funds were converted to XMR, and that a post-mortem and a plan for affected users will follow.
Pool Party runs pooled liquidity positions on Arbitrum, Base, Polygon, and Robinhood Chain. Each pool keeps a snapshot contract that records every user's position and drives withdrawals. Pool Party says the attacker found a vulnerability in that contract, used it to change their own recorded position, deposited 10 USDC, and withdrew all funds from the pool, then repeated the move pool by pool. Pools on Polygon and Robinhood Chain were not affected.
The attacker's wallet, 0x2075c17…446ab7f8f, was fresh when it received its first 10 USDC at 01:36 UTC. It then ran a loop of 10 USDC addLiquidity calls followed by withdraw calls, at first recovering only the deposit while it probed. At 01:56 UTC, it sent 10 USDC across the Across bridge as a test. From 02:19 UTC the withdrawal sizes increased: 2,138 USDC, then 72,051 USDC at 02:22 UTC, 68,110 USDC at 02:24 UTC, and 17,518 USDC at 02:26 UTC. In all, the wallet took 202,711 USDC from the pools, net of its own 10 USDC deposits: 190,715 USDC on Arbitrum and 11,996 USDC on Base, where its last withdrawal landed at 03:26 UTC.
Pool Party thanked pcaversaccio and SEAL 911 for help during the incident, says it has reported the attack to law enforcement and the exchanges involved, and that the attacker has already converted the funds to XMR. A bounty offer was posted to the attacker onchain, per DefiMonAlerts. Pool Party says it will publish a full post-mortem and a plan for affected users. No funds have been recovered to date.
Rujira Trade CCL Skew Flaw Drained Liquidity Providers
TL;DR: On the evening of November 10th an attacker exploited a flaw in the skew calculations behind Rujira Trade's Custom Concentrated Liquidity ranges, unbalancing BTC/USDC positions on THORChain's app layer, per Rujira. Rujira estimates the loss at $200,000, $175,000 of it from positions run by the market maker Liquidy Finance. THORChain node operators halted the CosmWasm app layer. Rujira says all losses will be reimbursed and that its upgraded FIN contract removes the skew parameter entirely.
Rujira Trade is an order book that runs as a CosmWasm contract, FIN, on THORChain's app layer. Its Custom Concentrated Liquidity feature lets a user turn base and quote assets into an automated market-making range inside the same contract as ordinary limit orders, with a skew parameter that shapes where liquidity sits inside the band. The quotes the range publishes are what takers trade against, so the curve that computes them is pricing code. An error in that code becomes a price someone can hit repeatedly.
Rujira said on November 11th that the previous evening’s suspicious activity on Rujira Trade caused a sharp price spike in the BTC/USDC market, followed by a surge in trading activity across the order book, and that its investigation pointed to an issue with the CCL skew calculations that let the attacker unbalance existing BTC/USDC positions. No attacker address or transaction has been published by Rujira. Panda Security notes that FailSafe's audit of FIN v2.1.1 carried a resolved medium finding on linear skew mispricing enabling systematic LP extraction; Rujira has not said whether this exploit used that issue. It is the second FIN incident in six weeks.
Rujira estimates the loss at $200,000: $175,000 from positions run by Liquidy Finance and $25,000 from other users, with SlowMist and DefiLlama carrying the same figure. THORChain node operators halted the CosmWasm app layer. On November 12th Rujira said the upgraded FIN contract was almost ready, that it removed the skew parameter and restored users' CCL positions, and that the app layer would resume after an audit and new monitoring. Rujira says all losses will be reimbursed.
Unocoin Hot Wallets Signed Away With Paper Backup Keys
TL;DR: Unocoin, an Indian exchange, detected unauthorized activity on November 6th, suspended every service on November 9th, and on November 14th said three of its more than 20 hot wallets had been compromised for an estimated $200,000. BitGo says the outgoing Ethereum transactions were signed with Unocoin's own user and backup keys outside BitGo's platform. Unocoin says eight-year-old paper backup keys were compromised and that it will cover the loss.
Unocoin held customer funds through a BitGo 2-of-3 multisig, in which Unocoin held a user key and a backup key and BitGo held the third, alongside Fireblocks accounts. The exchange detected unauthorized activity on November 6th and asked Fireblocks and BitGo to freeze its enterprise accounts at 11:24 and 11:29 UTC, which both did, per Crypto Briefing. Further unauthorized access to its servers on November 9th led Unocoin to suspend all services including logins and begin rebuilding its systems, a job it estimated at four to five working days. On November 12th it noticed outgoing Ethereum transactions from its BitGo wallet infrastructure.
BitGo's review found that those transactions were signed using the user and backup keys held by Unocoin and broadcast outside BitGo's platform. The review also stated that BitGo's key was never used, the November 6th freeze functioned as intended, and no other clients were affected. Unocoin said three of its more than 20 operational hot wallets were compromised, estimated the loss at $200,000, and that eight-year-old paper backup keys had been compromised. Unocoin said it will cover the loss from its own funds and that more than 90% of customer assets sit in cold storage, but has not confirmed the initial intrusion path or how the paper keys were obtained.
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